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ABSTRACT 
On January 14, 2009, the former Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral Mike 
McConnell (ret.), established The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).  The 
NMIC was created to serve as the national focal point for maritime intelligence, ensuring 
a unified national effort to execute the Maritime Strategy and the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security (NSMS) at all levels of government.  The establishment of the NMIC 
is part of the Navy’s response to an Intelligence Community Directive through which the 
DNI challenged all intelligence community (IC) elements to establish an “analytic 
outreach” initiative to “engage with individuals outside the intelligence community to 
explore ideas and alternate perspectives, gain new insights, generate new knowledge, or 
obtain new information.” That directive had been a response to recommendations from 
the 2005 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Report, which recommended that “IC analysts broaden 
their information horizons by collaborating with... expertise wherever it resides…” This 
thesis will examine the question: can the NMIC design and create a culture of trust and 
collaboration that collectively draws input from analyst, collector, and customer to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE 
CENTER 
On January 14, 2009, the former Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral 
Mike McConnell (ret.), established The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).  
The NMIC was created to serve as the national focal point for maritime intelligence, 
ensuring a unified national effort to execute the Maritime Strategy and the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) at all levels of government.1  The establishment 
of the NMIC is part of the Navy’s response to an Intelligence Community Directive2 
through which the DNI challenged all intelligence community (IC) elements to establish 
an “analytic outreach” initiative to “engage with individuals outside the intelligence 
community to explore ideas and alternate perspectives, gain new insights, generate new 
knowledge, or obtain new information.”3  That directive had been a response to 
recommendations from the 2005 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report, which recommended that 
“IC analysts broaden their information horizons by collaborating with... expertise 
wherever it resides…”4  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will examine the questions: Can the NMIC design and create a culture 
of trust and collaboration that collectively draws input from analyst, collector, and 
customer to effectively support maritime domain awareness intelligence support 
regarding homeland security?  Can it meet the challenge posed by the Director of 
National Intelligence and the WMD Commission?  
                                                 
1 Regina McNamara CDR USCG, “Ribbon Cutting Establishes the New National Maritime 
Intelligence Center,” http://www.navintpro.org/associations/4202/files/quarterly/NIPQIndex.htm (accessed 
6/9/2009). 
2 Office of The Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 205: Analytic 
Outreach. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/index.html (accessed 5/15/2009). 
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A culture-of-collaboration approach is about “maximizing time, talent and tools to 
create value based on [the] collective efforts” of contributors, participants and consumers 
of intelligence.5  In collaborating across federal, state, and local cultures, there is a 
dynamic that produces a broader perspective and creates greater value in the final product 
and has equal value amongst all participants.  This is particularly true when it comes to 
solving complex analytic problems that affect multiple customers in different ways.  This 
concept has three distinct characteristics that differ from the traditional isolated and 
stove-piped method of intelligence production: it acts as a force multiplier in an emerging 
threat environment that folds in new homeland security customers with a different 
perspective; it develops a community of interest that fosters information sharing and 
communication to effectively address time-sensitive threat warnings within the maritime 
domain; and lastly, it supports the call to create a culture of collaboration and revive 
imagination within the IC by challenging assessments and offering alternative analyses 
from a shared working group.  This newly established NMIC, in its early development, 
has the opportunity to review cases of successful collaboration in order to establish and 
develop a trusted culture-of-collaboration network to answer the mandate for intelligence 
reform from a need-to-know institution to a responsibility-to-provide network.6  
This thesis will argue that a culture of collaboration structured around the 
theoretical principles of trust building will prove successful in drawing input from the 
Maritime Community of Interest to effectively support a unified response to maritime 
domain awareness efforts with regard to homeland security.  Similar to the design and 
complement of the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) command design, 
which requires a unified response from various agencies and nations to combat drug 
trafficking, the NMIC will require a similar trusted environment to cover the complexity 
of challenges within the maritime domain.  This thesis will address the need for 
collaboration amongst a wide array of agencies and institutions with maritime 
responsibility to effectively provide a unified response to maritime security.  
                                                 
5  Evan Rosen, The Culture of Collaboration, 1st ed., http://www.thecultureofcollaboration.com/ 
(accessed 5/21/2009). 
6  Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community: Information 
Sharing Strategy.. 
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As stated in the National Strategy for Maritime Security: “The maritime domain 
in particular presents not only a medium by which threats can move, but offers a broad 
array of potential targets that fit the terrorists’ operational objectives of achieving mass 
casualties and inflicting catastrophic economic harm.”7  It should be viewed as a priority 
and a necessity to identify avenues of collaboration between stakeholders at all levels of 
government to protect our maritime interests as effectively as possible.  This proposed 
intelligence culture shift from stove-piped intelligence agencies, that incorporates 
elements of local, state, and federal entities with a vested interest in maritime security, 
could act as a nexus for future collaboration efforts concerning critical intelligence issues.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Call for Intelligence Reform 
No aspect of the U.S. government has received more attention since 9/11 than 
intelligence reform, and rightfully so.  As former 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee 
Hamilton stated, “The single most important tool that we have in preventing terrorist 
attacks is intelligence.”8  So why has intelligence reform been such a slow process?  The 
problem lies within structure, culture, and identifying the proper balance between 
security and disseminating information to trusted sources.  Amy Zegart points out that 
there is a significant difference between change and adaptation, “The key issue is whether 
those changes matter, or more precisely, whether the rate of change within an 
organization keeps pace the rate of change in the external environment.”9 For the most 
part, the current structure of the intelligence community and intelligence cycle is one  
that has stood strong since the end of WWII.10  
The predominant threat and focus of effort for the IC from the end of WWII 
through the early 1990s was the Soviet Union.  The intelligence structure formed around 
                                                 
7 United States Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Maritime Security.. 
8  Lee Hamilton, “Hamilton Shares Thoughts on 9/11.” 
http://www.homepages.indiana.edu/102204/text/hamilton.shtml (accessed 5/15/2009). 
9  Amy B. Zegart,  Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 20. 
10  Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach. 
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this adversarial giant, whose large footprint, over decades, created predictable patterns to 
use for indications and warnings.  After the fall of the Soviet Union, the re-shaping of the 
intelligence structure was frequently recommended, but intelligence organizations and 
officials, rooted in a traditional IC culture, fought the need, and the call for, a drastic 
overhaul.11  In today’s world, the United States faces a determined and innovative 
adversary who is willing to exploit the maritime domain to further their cause. As U.S. 
Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen points out, “…the threats we face in the 
maritime commons [today] tend to be agnostic to political boundaries and traditional 
jurisdictions.”12  Whether it is drug cartels smuggling narcotics in semi-submersibles, 
locally born extremist movements with a grudge against the government, or a global 
jihadist movement looking to find security vulnerabilities within a major port facility, the 
threat is real and emerging.  Gregory Treverton of RAND notes that, “To truly reshape 
intelligence gathering in order to meet today’s threats, all of the Cold War Legacy must 
be put on the table…”13 
Intelligence reform and organizational change is not actually a new concept, at 
least not in the way of review by official commissions, studies and recommendations to 
improve the coordination processes.  As Amy Zegart points out:  
Between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and September 11, 2001, no 
fewer than twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, 
and think tank task forces examined the U.S. Intelligence Community… 
All twelve reports offered not only extensive discussion of key problems 
but specific recommendations to fix them.14   
Intelligence reform is not only a call for re-structuring intelligence, but about a 
change in the culture of intelligence and understanding the underpinnings that allow 
trusted environments of collaboration to prosper.  The Intelligence Reform act of 2004 
                                                 
11  Zegart, Spying Blind, 31. 
12  Otto Kreisher, “Collaborative Approach, U.S. Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan 
Coordinates Federal Action in Ports and Far from Shore.” Seapower (5/2009). 
13  Gregory Treverton, “Intelligence Test: Post 9/11 Intel Reform Has Been in Name Only.  To Make 
America Safer, We Need Fundamental Change Across the Entire Government.” Democracy: A Journal of 
Ideas, Winter 2009, no. 11, http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6667 (accessed 5/15/2009). 
14  Zegart, Spying Blind, 27–28. 
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offers the foundation for moving in the right direction regarding intelligence reform.15  
The Act created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, charged with 
“establish[ing] objectives and priorities for the intelligence community” and managing 
the overall process of national intelligence.16  The Act also granted the DNI the authority 
to create a National Counter Terrorism Center to integrate foreign and domestic 
counterterrorism intelligence collection and analysis and strategic planning in support of 
operations.17  In addition to creating the position of DNI, the Intel Reform Act also 
answered the president’s directive for establishing an Information Sharing Environment 
(ISE) that would “facilitate the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate 
federal, state, local, tribal and private sector entities, through the use of policy guidelines 
and technologies.”  The ISE’s scope was later expanded as a result of the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to include homeland security 
information and weapons of mass destruction information as well.18  The Intelligence 
Reform Acts provisions were primarily designed to foster coordination and encourage 
culture change across the intelligence community, which is a complete culture shift from 
the traditional design of the IC.  These initiatives require buy-in across the IC in order to 
effectively establish the needed collaborative environment necessary, with members of 
the interagency, to address the threats of the twenty-first century.  
The doctrine to direct reform within the intelligence community has been clearly 
written, but merely changing the organizational charts within national intelligence does 
not answer the call for reform.19  The true test of reform will be found by identifying why 
cultural barriers exist and what causes the derailment of information sharing. In addition, 
identifying exactly who the customers are, understanding their needs is a critical step 
toward creating a culture of collaboration. 
                                                 
15  Gregory Treverton and Peter Wilson, “True Intelligence Reform is Cultural, Not Just 
Organizational Chart Shift,” The Christian Science Monitor 
www.rand.org/commentary/2005/01/13/CSM.html (accessed 5/15/2009). 
16 United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summary of Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/ConferenceReportSummary.doc 
(accessed 5/15/2009). 
17  Ibid. 
18  United States Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing. 
19  Treverton and Wilson, True Intelligence Reform is Cultural, Not Just Organizational Chart Shift.”  
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2. Maritime Domain Awareness—Identifying Seams in the System 
The United States government has identified three primary responsibilities in 
regards to maritime security: 
1. Produce and distribute timely and accurate threat advisory and 
alert information as well as appropriate protective measures to 
state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector, via a 
dedicated homeland security information network;  
2. Provide guidance and standards for reducing vulnerabilities  
3. Provide an active, layered, and scalable security presence to 
protect from and deter attacks.20 
The Department of Homeland Security has identified and broadly categorized the 
potential actors threatening the maritime domain to include nation-states, terrorists, and 
transnational criminals and pirates.21  These three categories help to better define the 
potential threats the NMIC faces, while also addressing the complexity of the issue of 
responding to all of them.  The idea of creating threat scenarios and identifying potential 
avenues of attack is not a new concept for the United States.  In fact, well before the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. Navy planners developed a threat scenario around 
a carrier-based air attack.  Unfortunately, Navy leadership in Washington and Hawaii did 
not consider the scenario a realistic one.22  The process more commonly referred to today 
as “red-teaming” was recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee Report on Iraq’s WMD programs, and the Butler Report.23  All 
three reports faulted groupthink of intelligence failures and called on alternative analyses 
                                                 
20  United States Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1981), 41.   
23  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 567, 
http://isbndb.com/d/book/the_9/11_commission_report_final_report_of_the_national_comm (accessed 
5/20/2009). United States Congress, Senate Intelligence Committee on Intelligence — Postwar Findings on 
Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they Compare with Prewar Assessments, 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf (accessed 6/6/2009). United Kingdom House of 
Commons, The Butler Report — Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf (accessed 6/6/2009). 
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and the need to exercise imagination as a routine matter.24  To effectively address the 
myriad of threats the maritime domain faces, it is essential to have: “integrated all-source 
intelligence, law enforcement information, and open-source data from the public and 
private sectors.”25 
Local law enforcement patrolling the shores of the United States received a wake-
up call for collaboration after witnessing the Mumbai attack’s success in November 2008.  
Less than a dozen operatives were able to shut down a city the size of Los Angeles by 
creating organized chaos throughout the streets of Mumbai.26  Those responsible for 
responding to and preventing similar attacks are well aware of the trends and are 
adjusting accordingly.  In April 2009, The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) 
held a workshop to address “Mumbai-style” attacks within the Los Angeles region in 
order to address the concepts of incident command, unified command, multiple emerging 
simultaneous incidents, and unified action within the region.27  This preliminary tabletop 
discussion included players from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles 
Police Department, Los Angeles County Fire Department, Mass Transit Authority, and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  This tabletop exercise created heated discussions 
over “who’s in charge” in such a chaotic and multi-threat environment and how to 
coordinate and respond effectively with limited resources.  Heated or not, it was viewed 
by one seasoned sergeant in the LASD as “probably in the top three of my career, for best 
participation at a command level.”28  These issues are tough to work through, mostly 
because of cultural barriers in organizations.  However, the Los Angeles County first 
responders realize the catastrophic consequences likely if they do not collaborate.  In 
May 2009, an actual live exercise was scheduled to take place to work out the 
                                                 
24  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 567). 
25  United States Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
26  Rosa Brooks, “War on Terror —an Exercise in Folly,” Los Angeles Times, sec. Opinion, 04 
12/2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-brooks4-2008dec04,0,6204083.column (accessed 
6/1/2009). 
27  James Sully, SGT, Personal e-mail concerning Command Workshop for Common Ground Exercise 
In LA County. 
28  Sully, personal e-mail. 
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relationship between fusion center and responding authorities and to stress-test the 
relationship of Los Angeles County first responders.  The results of this exercise have not 
been made available to the public at this time. 
The tactics used in the Mumbai attack were proven to be effective in causing mass 
chaos for both civilians and responding authorities.  There was an obvious disconnect, 
not only between first responders, but also between intelligence agencies and government 
authorities as well.  Not only did U.S. officials warn India of an imminent sea-borne 
attack, they warned twice.29  Local Indian officials who have reviewed the Mumbai 
attacks have pointed out that the only way to have stopped the Mumbai attacks would 
have been to respond while the Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives were still at sea.  What 
role will the NMIC play in coordinating and releasing threat warnings to first responders 
that have responsibility for maritime security?  Local authorities are already exercising 
the relationship and coordination piece so they can respond accordingly, but has the 
information pipeline been identified to relay threat warnings from national intelligence? 
3. A Collaborative Intelligence Environment 
There is no such thing as information sharing; there is only information 
trading.30 
Academics, business leaders, and others have discussed and written about 
collaboration and team building for decades.  There is a great deal of discussion in the 
collaboration literature examining the elements of success in a collaborative endeavor.  
Back in 1999, the MITRE Corporation conducted a survey of the IC documenting the 
factors inhibiting collaboration.  MITRE concluded the following: 
… a strong competitive culture exists among the agencies. A key factor 
driving competition is the budget process in which agencies vie for 
resources. IC agencies more typically publish intelligence reports in 
competition with each other as opposed to collaborating on joint efforts. It 
                                                 
29 IANS, “US Warned India Twice of Mumbai Attack by Sea a Month Ago,” Thaindian News, 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/us-warned-india-twice-of-mumbai-attack-by-sea-a-
month-ago-reports-lead_100126422.html (accessed 5/18/2009). 
30  Christopher Dickey, Securing the City, Inside America's Best Counterterror Force-the NYPD, 
(New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 140. 
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is also difficult for agencies to accept that they do not have to be self-
sufficient but rather can depend on the expertise and data from other 
organizations to meet their mission. The IC's standard practice of 
compartmentation and intelligence stovepipes also minimizes information 
sharing.31 
The MITRE study does not mean to imply that collaboration intends to 
necessarily inhibit competitive analysis (i.e., groupthink).  As author and intelligence 
analyst Robert Clark points out, “Collaboration, properly handled, is intended to help 
competitive analysis by ensuring that competing views share as much information about 
the target as possible.”32  The collaborative approach also reaches past the traditional 
customer base of “other intelligence agencies” and draws from operators’ perspectives.  
This expanded view offers two benefits to intelligence analysis: first, it shows or 
introduces the operator to the value of analysis when dealing with complex issues;33 
second, in a collaborative analytical environment, there is no single point of failure in the 
“cycle,” as the community of interest takes responsibility for the end product.34  
Studies have shown that culture is the number one barrier in regards to 
information sharing and establishing trust.35  Other issues include lack of common goals 
for collaboration, individual biases and turf battles, system interoperability, and lack of 
perceived mutual benefit to participate in collaboration.36  
The National Strategy for Information Sharing states the need for a paradigm shift 
regarding intelligence practices.37  This strategy calls for an overhaul of the cold war era 
structure to one that allows intelligence officials to face emerging threats to homeland 
security.38  Additionally, the National Strategy calls on the intelligence community to 
                                                 
31  Tamara Hall, Intelligence Community Collaboration Baseline Study, MITRE Corporation (1999) 
(accessed 5/18/2009). 
32  Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach, 1st ed., 21. 
33  Ibid., 20. 
34  Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 19. 
35  Hall, Intelligence Community Collaboration Baseline Study. 
36  Ibid. 
37  United States Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 1. 
38  Ibid. 
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view the state and urban fusion centers as a valuable information-sharing resource and 
one that should be incorporated into the national information-sharing framework.39  The 
DNI points out in the Intelligence Community Information Strategy that: “…information 
sharing is a behavior and not a technology.”40 The DNI also notes that the new threat 
environment forces the intelligence community to review “new national and homeland 
security customers” in order to sufficiently address the threat.41  The MITRE study also 
pointed out that: “To date, most of the initiatives within the IC have focused on the 
technical requirements to support IC collaboration” without acknowledging that 
organizational culture is most likely the causal variable in the failure to collaborate.42  
The Department of Homeland Security, while still in its infancy, has realized the value of 
organizational culture and has invested in a culture of change and collaboration by 
increasing analytic support and presence in state and local fusion centers around the 
nation.43 They have quickly grasped the value of interpersonal relationships in a fused 
environment.  The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), often viewed as the 
nexus for future collaboration ventures in intelligence, has noted in its information-
sharing policy that difficult issues remain, including the ability to share critical 
information with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector.44 While the 
NCTC has made great strides collectively organizing and sharing across the IC,45 there 
are still voids in coverage, and unfortunately, those voids affect the first responders 
charged with responding to potential threats.  
                                                 
39  United States Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 1. 
40 Office of The Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community: Information 
Sharing Strategy, 1. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Hall, Intelligence Community Collaboration Baseline Study. 
43  United States Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Information 
Sharing Strategy. 
44 Director, National Counter Terrorism Center, NCTC and Information Sharing: Five Years since 
9/11, A Progress Report. 
45 NCTC host’s counterterrorism community-wide secure video teleconferences (SVTCs) three times 
daily to ensure broad awareness of ongoing operations and newly detected threats.  During these SVTCs, 
participants compare notes, highlight new threats, and debunk erroneous reports. 
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D. THESIS OUTLINE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first chapter is the introduction and will cover the scope and methodology for 
this thesis.  The second chapter will review the background of the National Maritime 
Intelligence Center and the transformation process it is currently undertaking.  The third 
chapter will review the underpinnings of trust building by reviewing scholarly work on 
trust building techniques at the organizational and inter-personal levels.  The fourth 
chapter will review the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South organization, where trust 
relationships exist in a collaborative environment.  This chapter will attempt to review the 
theoretical suggestions of scholars on trust, and identify whether trust-building 
techniques are being implemented in this organization or whether other circumstances 
have led to successful collaboration within this organization.  The final chapter offers 
conclusions and recommendations for building trust within a collaborative environment. 
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II. BACKGROUND—STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL 
MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND INFORMATION-
SHARING INITIATIVES 
A. HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI) 
The Office of Naval Intelligence has served as the epicenter for naval intelligence 
for over 126 years.  As the oldest continuously operating intelligence agency in the 
United States, ONI has served as the nation’s depository for maritime intelligence since 
its creation shortly after the Civil War.  ONI was established to address the decline in 
maritime intelligence in regards to the capabilities and tactics of foreign navies and in an 
effort to transition the U.S. Navy into a new era.  ONI’s mission, at the onset of its 
creation, was to focus on supporting the modernization needs of the U.S. Navy by 
providing insight on foreign naval powers’ capabilities and the construction methods of 
their ships.  The office was also to serve as a depository for information concerning new 
tactics and the designs of foreign navies.  Secretary of the Navy William H. Chandler, 
instructed the ONI “to collect, compile, record, and correct information on fourteen 
categories of naval intelligence.”46 He also envisioned that this information would be 
readily available to every naval officer.47 
Shortly after the Civil War, the United States Navy downsized to only a few 
obsolete ships in comparison to naval powers in Europe. Lieutenant Theodorus Bailey 
Myers Mason, who was selected to serve as the first commander of ONI, realized the 
urgent need for the transformation and modernization of the U.S. Navy, and the need for 
a more robust maritime intelligence center.48 Mason pressed for “…the creation of an 
intelligence office to collect and disseminate information on the latest technological 
developments abroad to support the modernization of the U.S. Navy.”49  Fighting for an 
                                                 
46  Jeffery Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, the Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency 
1865–1918, Naval Institute Press, 1979, 14. 
47  Ibid., 15. 
48 ONI Web site, Command History, www.nmic.navy.mil (accessed 5/18/2009). 
49 Ibid. 
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official establishment that would focus on naval modernization concerns, the United 
States Naval Institute was established in 1873, in Annapolis, which served as a semi-
official think tank for naval officers to discuss and develop a transformation plan for a 
new modern navy.50  Mason served as the institute’s secretary in 1879 and helped 
formulate a prototype office for what would become ONI in 1882.51  The creation of the 
office was not widely accepted amongst the other bureaus.52  Mason noted that the 
reluctance of other jealous bureaus to share information with the newly established 
organization ultimately delayed ONI’s ability to produce relevant intelligence.53 Rear 
Admiral A.G. Berry (Ret.), who was a plank owner of ONI, stated that the new office met 
with great opposition in its early years.54 He shared one experience he encountered with 
the Bureau of Steam Engineering, “The Bureau…had some ordnance notes but refused to 
give them up, and it required an order from the Secretary to compel that bureau to turn 
them over to the new office.”55 The lack of coordination and collaboration amongst the 
bureaus early on was likely, in part, due to the failure of the Navy to consult the other 
bureaus on the utility and purpose of ONI, thus a lack of trust existed amongst the 
bureaus and created barriers in information sharing.  Mason knew, however, that for the 
newly established office to be successful and have an impact on naval modernization, the 
other bureaus must see the value in ONI serving as a central depository of naval 
information.56  
While intelligence support for homeland security may seem like a new focus area 
for ONI, in 1916 Congress authorized and approved budget increases that led to the first 
major transformation of ONI's role in “supporting domestic security operations, including 
                                                 
50 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, the Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency 1865–
1918, 8. 
51  Ibid., 9. 
52  Ibid., 17. 
53  Ibid., 18. 
54  A. G. Berry, “The Beginning of the Office of Naval Intelligence,” U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 63 (1/1937), 102. 
55  Ibid. 
56 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, the Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency 1865–
1918, 18. 
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protecting America's ports, harbors and defense plants from enemy infiltration, 
subversion and sabotage.”57 Because of these new intelligence requirements, ONI had to 
collaborate closely with multiple government bureaus to effectively address this new 
mission set.   Similar to today’s transformation, ONI has adapted, since its inception, to 
address not only foreign naval capabilities, but also national security concerns that affect 
the homeland. 
ONI underwent another transformation with the build-up of World War II.  This 
transformation was brought about due to the need for focused intelligence on both 
German and Japanese naval capabilities and the development of ways to defeat their 
navies. During this transformation, ONI became the clearing-house for signals 
intelligence and photographic intelligence, in support of the war, that ultimately 
broadened their capabilities and customer base yet again.  Additionally, ONI created a 
schoolhouse for intelligence officers to support the emerging need for timely, relevant, 
and predictive intelligence in support of operational commanders.  Similar to the 
transition during WWII, the naval intelligence community today is facing a growing 
demand for actionable intelligence and the desire to reclaim maritime intelligence 
superiority.  Under direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of Naval 
Intelligence, today’s Naval Intelligence Community is attempting to overhaul its sharing 
and collaborative processes in order to reclaim its role in “information dominance and 
decision superiority.”58 
From the end of WWII to the end of the Cold War, ONI progressed and 
transitioned into a center of excellence for operational intelligence and scientific and 
technical intelligence in support of countering the threat posed by the former USSR.   
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, ONI was 
destined for another transformation that would allow their organization to support both 
                                                 
57 Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, the Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency 1865–
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conventional maritime threats and the emergence of a highly adaptive non-state adversary 
that has the ability to be both flexible and agile.59  
Despite several physical moves throughout the D.C. area since its creation in the 
late 1800s, ONI has continued its intelligence support role for operational commanders.  
Today the Office of Naval Intelligence operates out of Suitland, Maryland, along with the 
Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), which now, under the Department 
of Homeland Security, plays a key role in supporting domestic homeland security 
maritime missions by supporting Coast Guard intelligence centers around the nation. The 
facility continues to expand, with the early 2009 designation from the Director of 
National Intelligence, as the nationally recognized center for maritime intelligence, which 
broadens the scope of responsibility of NMIC’s traditional role of foreign navy 
capabilities and white shipping, to a broader reach of maritime concerns, including 
maritime threats to homeland security. 
B. MODERNIZATION AND REORGANIZATION OF ONI 
Having realized the need for more defined operational intelligence support for 
both conventional maritime threats and asymmetric warfare, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence underwent its latest vigorous restructure in January of 2009, by order of the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, to better align with the needs of the operators and decision 
makers.60  This transition brought about four new centers of excellence to support the 
Chief of Naval Operations call to restore Naval Intelligence to prominence and 
dominance: 
1. Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center—This center is responsible for 
Maritime Domain Awareness, 24/7 Maritime Operations watch floor and the Fleet and 
Global Maritime Intelligence Integration.  Serving as the central nerve center of the 
NMIC, this center will play a pivotal role in the NMIC’s overall success in building trust 
amongst its wide array of customers.  This center’s watch floor is responsible for 
                                                 
59  Wyman Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (Washington D.C.: Department of the 
Navy, 1996), 145. 
60  Office of Naval Information, Transforming Naval Intelligence, 1/6/2010. 
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identifying and disseminating threat warning indicators within the maritime domain, and 
also serves as the reporting station for any Maritime Operational Threat Response 
(MOTR) alerts, which we will discuss in greater detail in the following pages.  
Identifying and building the relationships needed with first responders who require 
maritime intelligence will play a large part in building the collaborative environment 
necessary to address homeland security concerns within the maritime domain. With the 
expansion of the NMIC and the call by the former Director of National Intelligence to 
expand the role of ONI, the NMIC was established to orchestrate the MDA process and 
serve the needs for national maritime intelligence.  Because of this unique role of the 
Nimitz center, this thesis will, in large part, focus on this center of excellence and its 
adapting role within the global maritime community of interest as well as its role in 
building a solid trust foundation amongst the maritime community, in order to facilitate 
smooth communication across a wide-ranging audience.61 
2. Farragut Technical Analysis Center—Focuses on adversary weapons, 
platforms, combat systems and future technical capabilities.62 
3. Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center—Designed to support a reach-back 
mechanism for Naval Special Warfare and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 
forces. 
4. Hopper Information Services Center—Established to improve 
interoperability with information technology by providing a service-oriented 
architecture.63 
C. TRANSFORMATION OF THE NMIC AND ITS ROLE IN NATIONAL 
MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
As previously mentioned, in January 2009, the former Director of National 
Intelligence, Mike McConnell, declared that the NMIC would serve as the national hub 
for maritime intelligence.  This is largely due to the need for a central nerve center for 
                                                 




maritime domain awareness and to align with the goals set forth by the president in the 
National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Strategy for Maritime Domain 
Awareness, and Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan.  The NMIC, still in its 
infancy, faces the daunting task of coordinating and collaborating with over 26 national 
agencies, in addition to expanding its scope to include state and local homeland security 
fusion centers with maritime interests.   
The National Strategy for Maritime Security laid out eight subordinate plans to 
support the implementation and coordination processes needed to successfully execute a 
plan to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.  Former President George W. Bush defined 
the maritime domain as “All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterways, including all maritime-related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”64  The 
subordinate plan that lays out the roles and responsibilities of the NMIC and other 
national agencies is the MOTR plan.  The MOTR plan is one of the eight subordinate 
plans that were implemented to coordinate the threat response processes amongst the U.S. 
government by identifying and establishing specific roles and responsibilities for all 
agencies that have maritime responsibility.65  The MOTR concept of operations was 
established to coordinate response planning prior to an actual event to avoid confusion 
and enable national agencies to respond and coordinate against maritime threats in a 
timely fashion.  Within the MOTR plan, the NMIC is designated as the lead agency of the 
Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII).  Identified as a lead agency concerning 
coordination and collaboration in the event of a maritime threat, the NMIC’s 
responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following missions: 
Creating and overseeing a collaborative information environment for the 
global maritime community of interest that informs and guides operational 
planning and response to ensure the security of the maritime domain… 
The NMIC core element coordinates its maritime intelligence information  
 
 
                                                 
64  The United States Department of Homeland Security, Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan 
for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, The Department of Homeland Security (2006). 
65  Ibid. 
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sharing and analytical efforts to become the center of excellence for 
strategic maritime intelligence analysis and information integration for the 
U.S. government.66 
Within the first months of its inception, the NMIC was tasked by the National 
Security Council to respond to the established U.S. National mechanism for maritime 
threat response, MOTR plan activation.67  The timing of the activation coincided with a 
piracy conference that was taking place at ONI.  The former director of the NMIC, 
RADM Gilbride, was in the process of hosting a conference on international Horn of 
Africa Piracy that included members of the National Security Council, academics, 
foreign partners, the maritime industry, and operators to collaborate on effective 
measures to stop piracy in the region.  The conference was originally scheduled to be 
from 7–8 April 2009 and include key members of the maritime community of interest.  
On the last day of the conference, the panel and guests were all in attendance when 
information on the attack of the Maersk Alabama while en route to Kenya to deliver food 
aid came in.  The ship was attacked by four pirates who were unable to take control of the 
ship.  At some point, the pirates realized their attempt to seize the Alabama had failed and 
fled the ship with the ship’s lifeboat and captain as hostage.  Within only a few short 
hours, under the recommendation of the National Security Council and previous 
Homeland Security Council, the National MOTR plan was activated.68 In this time of 
crisis, the conference participants collaborated to support a common goal of rescuing the 
Captain of the Maersk Alabama.  The NMIC took on its role of coordinating maritime 




                                                 
66 Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
67 The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) is an interagency process under National 
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knowledge and the participating members of the piracy conference, the NMIC was able 
to communicate to a wide-ranging audience throughout the MOTR activation, which 
lasted eight days.69   
This unique coordinated response offered a glimpse of the ideal collaborative 
environment where institutional barriers were not an issue and where a collective whole 
focused on a unified response to a specific issue.  The NMIC was able to quickly 
capitalize on a shared crisis that created a focused environment where all participants had 
the same desired end-state.  In this event, each organization was also able to realize that a 
coordinated response was necessary to achieve its goals.  As individual organizations, 
they did not have the manpower or the resources to achieve their desired end-state.  In a 
crisis situation, institutional barriers between organizations are often easier to break for 
the sake of accomplishing a mission.  Having all participants centrally located in the 
NMIC also supported communication and broke down the traditional barriers of 
information sharing.  The NMIC has the opportunity to capitalize on this experience, but 
must first understand the factors that made this collaborative event a success in order to 
apply the findings outside of a crisis management situation.  First and foremost, the 
structure of the NMIC offered the ideal command and control nerve center to effectively 
coordinate operations and fuse intelligence information between defense and interagency 
intelligence agencies. Members of the Maritime Community of Interest attending the 
piracy conference included key stakeholders from all walks of the maritime community.  
Having subject matter expertise from industry, military, and the interagency on site 
created an environment where expertise from every field was readily available, and 
minimized agency barriers that are often present, and prevent collaboration. U.S. Coast 
Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen gave his remarks on the first MOTR response:  
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Response (MOTR) protocol, a novel concept to orchestrate intra-
governmental efforts in maritime incidents, played a positive and 
significant role. This protocol facilitates interagency unity of effort, 
efficient information flow and decision-making.70 
The Maersk Alabama MOTR response is a prime example of the evolving 
maritime threat environment and the potential for overlapping jurisdictional concerns that 
require close collaboration amongst the Maritime Community of Interest in order to 
determine the best course of action. The NMIC’s expanding role will require a trust-
based foundation to support the collaborative process needed to address maritime domain 
concerns with precision, similar to JIATF-S’s collaborative model that requires multiple 
agencies to coordinate and respond in a unified effort to combat drug trafficking.  A trust-
based foundation is a necessity in developing an interagency organization because each 
agency has information security concerns, different objectives, and organization cultures 
that must be understood by all participating agencies if a coordinated and collaborative 
approach is required.  The JIATF-S model has been viewed by many in the interagency 
as the gold standard for interagency collaboration and will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters.  
To address the growing demand for maritime intelligence, both in crisis situations 
and everyday coordination, the NMIC will need to establish a trusted environment for 
interagency partners to operate in effectively.   
While the first MOTR response is viewed by the participants as a success, 
creating an organization that incorporates the expertise from a wide range of agencies 
requires time and patience to establish credibility, acceptance, and most importantly, 
trust, to operate in a coordinated manner on a day-to-day basis. 
The ONI centers of excellence, which support the NMIC, have built a strong 
reputation for their naval intelligence support for tactical, operational, and strategic 
leadership for quite some time.  The 24/7 Nimitz watch floor serves as an avenue for 
naval leadership to tap into at anytime to address issues that arise and receive intelligence 
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support.  The fact that ONI is the longest serving intelligence agency, and has evolved 
over time to support mission commanders, solidifies the newly established NMIC’s 
mission of expanding maritime intelligence to a much wider audience.  The trust 
foundation ONI has built, as a competent supplier of naval intelligence, will play a 
critical role in establishing the trust environment needed within the NMIC for interagency 
partners to operate in.  The NMIC has the opportunity to capitalize from the success of its 
first MOTR plan response by continuing to find effective ways of communicating within 
the inter-agency, and by creating a culture within the NMIC that focuses on collaboration 
and critical trust building methods that will be discussed in Chapter III.  
D. NATIONAL INFORMATION-SHARING EFFORTS BY THE DIRECTOR 
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (INFORMATION SHARING 
ENVIRONMENT) 
For the NMIC to create a trusted collaborative environment, it requires the proper 
structural foundations and doctrine to support a culture shift within the IC.   The 2004 
Intelligence Reform Act created both the position of the Director of National Intelligence 
and the call for establishing an Information Sharing Environment to address a major 
shortfall cited in the 9/11 Commission Report.  Along with the 9/11 Commission’s 
findings, several other studies have also cited a lack of information sharing within the 
intelligence community and the need for intelligence reform (see Figure 1).  Since the 
ISE’s inception in 2005, The ISE Manager has stated, “exceptional progress has been 
made to implement the ISE nationwide.”  This initiative is a drastic change in the 
intelligence community’s culture and has taken an exceptional amount of work to 
implement the processes necessary to move in the right direction.  In the 2009 ISE annual 
report to Congress, the initiative transitioned from implementation to developing the 
framework to support the “most developed information-sharing environment in 
government to date.”71 
 
                                                 




Figure 1.   From 2009 Annual Report to Congress, Information Sharing Environment72  
The ISE framework is built around four functional areas—creating a culture of 
sharing; reducing barriers to sharing; improving sharing practices; and institutionalizing 
sharing.73  Sharing information, however, requires a great deal of trust amongst 
participating organizations. Creating a framework that institutionalizes “sharing” will 
only succeed if the underpinnings for collaboration exist. The ISE framework at the 
organizational level, institutionalizing sharing practices will create a standard to measure 
progress within the organization and against other organizations.  The idea of openness 
and reciprocity within a shared environment are key elements to building trust at the 
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organizational level and will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.  The ISE 
framework proposed has the potential to support the change in culture within the IC if the 
proper steps are taken to understand how trust develops amongst organizations.  If the 
foundational issues of trust building are not institutionalized within the ISE’s efforts, 
organizations will work around loopholes in information sharing. The ISE has developed 
what they call the maturity model concept to assess progress in information sharing over 
time (see Figure 2).  Understanding your desired end-state is step one in developing any 
strategy to achieve your desired end-state.   If the goal is to institutionalize information 
sharing and collaboration, then building a network and environment that supports trust 
building is a critical step in achieving a shared environment.  The ISE’s efforts to create a 
structure that can facilitate collaboration is not the end-all answer to solving stove-piped 
systems, but it does help dissolve bureaucratic walls that have traditionally blocked 
collaboration from agency to agency.  The Information Sharing Environment is an IC-
wide initiative that requires a complete culture change from the way the IC has 
traditionally viewed intelligence and the way it has conducted business.  
  
  
Figure 2.   From Annual Report to Congress, ISE Maturity Model Concept74 
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E. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE ROLE OF TRUSTED RELATIONSHIPS 
The goal of achieving maritime domain awareness cannot come to fruition if a 
trust bond is not created amongst the various agencies responsible for implementing the 
MDA Concept of Operations (MDA CONOPS).  This plan references several shortfalls 
in creating a collaborative network of trust across agencies, to include, “lack of trusted 
partnerships,” “incorrectly perceived policy restrictions on sharing data,” and “limited 
interagency communications.”75  The MDA CONOPS weighs trust as a critical element 
in the overall success of MDA: 
Effective Intelligence and information sharing is critical to understanding 
the maritime domain and improving safety and security of the United 
States.  For information sharing to succeed, there must be trust—the trust 
of information providers, the users of information, policymakers, and most 
importantly of the public.  Each of these must believe that information is 
being shared appropriately, consistent with law and in a manner protective 
of privacy and civil liberties.76 
The MDA CONOPS is structured around identifying key “Enterprising Hubs” to 
assume responsibility for certain functional areas (see Figure 3).77 The plan’s architecture 
is based around specific agencies’ “respective area of expertise” and assigning 
coordination responsibilities for specific fields (e.g., vessels, cargo, people, infrastructure, 
and architecture management).78  Unless trusted relationships that will support the 
implementation of this CONOPS are built, the plan will never reach its full potential.  
The enterprising hubs cover a wide range of agencies that do not necessarily have a well-
defined working relationship.  Understanding the factors that go into building and 
managing trusted relationships will ultimately support the NMIC’s expanding 
requirements as an agency lead in MDA and the DNI’s goal of openness and a  
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responsibility to provide, within the intelligence community at large, and include the 
expanding domestic Homeland Security mission that has not traditionally benefited from 
national intelligence agencies. 
 
Figure 3.   From the National Concept of Operations to Achieve MDA, Enterprising  
Hub Structure79 
These three endeavors call into question: how do you successfully build trust? 
What are the critical factors that support the establishment of a trusted relationship 
amongst such a wide-ranging audience, which demands different requirements and needs  
to satisfy each organization’s intelligence? As important as understanding the critical 
factors of building trust, what are the factors that will cause trust to break amongst 
organizations?  Understanding the ramifications of lost trust is just as important as 
building trust because lost trust could impede future collaborative efforts and negate any 
efforts of collaboration in the future. The following chapters will try to address these very 
issues and identify what scholars have noted as the key factors of building trust.   
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These three endeavors are all intertwined and require multiple agencies’ support 
and contribution for each to be successful.  Identifying what works in trust building, as 
well as what does not work, will ultimately provide a strategy that can focus limited 
resources in the right area in order to achieve maximum benefit and return in order to 
build a collaborative environment that supports all three. 
 28
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST IN COLLABORATIVE 
NETWORKS  
Organizational and interpersonal trust has been identified as a pivotal success 
factor for collaboration in both the private and public sectors. This chapter will focus on 
the underpinnings of collaborative team trust building. It will review current practices, 
literature, methodology, and the outcomes of trust building. The chapter will also attempt 
to extrapolate common trust threads throughout the trust literature in order to understand 
their significance in building a trusted environment.  Additionally, this chapter will 
recommend specific actions for building inter-agency collaborative trust.  
Proposed is a structural and inter-personal model for trust building in any inter-
agency setting that requires relationships with agencies from various backgrounds. 
Integrating trust building into an organization’s environment has the potential to support 
the NMIC’s expansion into domestic intelligence support for Homeland Security as well 
as their conventional maritime intelligence support role.  In today's threat environment, it 
will become crucial for agencies to collaborate in order to maximize threat warning and 
reach all intended customers.  Collaborative initiatives take place so that collaborating 
agencies can achieve a set end-state or goal that they could not achieve individually.  
The NMIC has a unique opportunity to take advantage of various agencies’ 
expertise in today’s dynamic operating environment that often requires a collaborative 
environment. In this era of inter-agency cooperation, how do organizations develop the 
relationships and trust that is necessary to successfully operate and accomplish a wide 
range of mission sets?80  The general literature regarding building trust amongst 
organizations with different cultures, missions, and capabilities suggests there are key 
structural formulations that are most likely to lead to effective trust relationships between  
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such organizations.  Are these structural formulations being applied effectively according 
to the recommendations of trust theory between national intelligence organizations and 
inter-agency partners?  
Based on a review of the general trust literature, there are several principles that 
can be considered essential to developing trust. When organizations work together, trust 
relationships are made up of two fundamental relationships: inter-personal and 
organizational. Inter-personal trust is discussed in great length by authors such as Stephen 
Covey. In Covey’s discussion of trust, he outlines four core competencies of trust:  “1) 
Integrity: Are you Congruent? 2) Intent: What’s your agenda? 3) Capabilities: Are you 
relevant? and 4) Results: What’s your track record?”81  Each of these core competencies 
must be exuded in each inter-personal relationship to truly facilitate trust within an 
organization.  
While principles such as Covey’s are critical for maintaining an overall sense of 
trust within an organization as a whole, organizations may require additional means of 
developing trust. At a structural level, however, there are more strategic 
recommendations for managing trust within an organization.  Trust scholars such as 
Andrew Van de Ven and Peter Smith Ring argue that there has been a significant shift 
within modern society from interpersonal trust to a reliance on institutional trust.82 Their 
claim echoes those of L. G. Zucker who is cited by several authors for his research on the 
evolution of trust in American society from one of interpersonal relationships to one 
reliant on institution-based relationships. 
Zucker’s 1986 studies indicated that there were two distinct means of structuring 
an organization to build trust: informal structure or formal structure—social interactions 
may be enough to generate trust if a project is temporary; however, a long-term project 
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may require bureaucratically guided, procedure-based interactions to “[assure] 
consistency.”83 Social networks can also be replaced with formal processes and 
procedures codified into the network — the higher level of institutional based trust, as 
developed from these bureaucratically guided procedures, the lower the need for inter-
personal trust to successfully operate.84 Zucker notes that, “from the institutional 
perspective, organizational structure may be less a means of organizing for efficient 
production and more a means of generating trust.”85 Van de Ven and Ring argue that trust 
can be supplanted at the organizational level by “relational quality…reputation…and 
legitimacy.”86 
To further generate trust within and amongst these institutions, scholars have 
several recommendations.  Sztompka notes the importance of structure in eliciting trust in 
his analysis of the effective organization of an entity.87 In order to create trust, he 
articulates five critical structural contexts that must be present: 1) normative coherence, 
2) stability of the social order, 3) transparency, 4) familiarity, and 5) accountability.88 
Consistent and coherent legislation must codify these values.89  To further the structural 
mechanisms for trust, Sztompka notes that there are contextual methods of facilitating 
trust as well: encouraging accountability, pre-commitment, and situations that require 
reciprocal trust.90   
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To balance the general trust literature, much of the inter-agency critiques focus on 
the difficulties of relying on such structural formations to create trust and facilitate 
successful operations.  James Carafano warns of the U.S. repeating history in its inter-
agency reforms, specifically the dangers of ignoring the significance of human interaction 
and relying on the bureaucratic structure to develop trust.91 
Uniquely, while Americans in general are becoming more and more distrustful of 
one another, the U.S. military continues to enjoy high levels of trust.92 In his analysis of 
the military’s development of trust with the general public, David King and Zachary 
Krabell argue that successful military performance (internal reform and successful high 
profile military operations such as Grenada and Panama), professionalism (end of the 
draft, racial integration), and effective use of its symbolic power since the 1970s has 
engendered public trust.93  The U.S. military also aligns with Sztompka’s analysis of the 
three means of judging trust within an initial interaction: reputation, performance and 
appearance.94  In these categories, the military may engender more trust than other 
agencies due to its successful reputation (credentials and competence), performance 
(“actual deeds”), and appearance and demeanor (uniforms, fitness, manners, 
marketing).95 
In spite of arguments that the U.S. military has generated trust among the general 
American public as a competent organization, it has an arguably blemished history in the 
realm of inter-agency operations in generating trust. Due to its difficult history with inter-
agency operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued in 1996, and again in 2006, the Joint 
Publication 3-08 offering guidance on how the U.S. military should interact with other 
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agencies.96  It offers guidance similar to that suggested by the aforementioned trust 
scholars.  Mainly, it provides insights into how the military should perceive the inter-
agency context to facilitate trust: coordination and planning must be done outside of the 
context of military command and control, and, other agencies must rely primarily on 
“perceived mutually supportive interest” to develop relationships rather than formal 
authority.97 Unified goals must be achieved and must develop functional 
interdependence.98  Others scholars offer still more specific guidance with respect to 
inter-organization operations. The Critical Infrastructure Protection report on “Public 
Trust” argued that a clear communications chain was paramount to inter-agency 
success.99  
Following a thorough review of the trust literature, the remaining portion of this 
chapter will attempt to identify the consistent trust themes that carry over from various 
disciplines in order to identify the key factors that support a trusted relationship and offer 
a foundation for newly established organizations like the NMIC to explore and utilize.  
Trust is dynamic and can change over a period of time.100  Trust is not as simple as “yes, 
I trust someone” or “no, I don’t trust someone.”  Trust operates on multiple layers and 
this chapter will attempt to separate trust relationships into what has been identified as the 
three common themes of trust: competence trust, ethical trust, and emotional trust.101  
This concept is similar to Covey’s two-part trust composition of character and 
competence trust. Romahn’s model, however, separates emotional and ethical trust from 
character trust as ethical trust is based upon the trustor’s expectations of any given 
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situation and may not involve or require any emotional relationship with the trustee.102  
Additionally, high and low levels of emotional trust can dominate and falsify the other 
categories of trust, thus the need to create a specific category for emotional trust.103 
Some element or resemblance of competence trust is the most dominant thread 
throughout the literature on trust, and probably, once established, is the most stable form 
of trust overall.  This form of trust builds upon ability, performance, and track record for 
a specific job or tasking.  Building competence trust is at the foundation of building a 
solid trust relationship, both personally and within an organization, because it requires 
proof of ability in a specific field, especially when a new relationship is being formed 
without any previous interaction or experience.   There is little difference in the business 
world.  As Covey points out, people want to know about your results because this helps 
establish some level of competence in any given field.104 
The second common thread of trust identified is ethical trust.  Ethical trust is built 
upon expectations that either an individual or organization’s interests will be taking care 
of.105  Rohman states, “Ethical trust is based on the trustor’s expectations and how well 
they are being met.”106   With that said, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the 
expectations for all organizations contributing to the collaborative network and knowing 
that these expectations may change over time. This is a critical factor in supporting a 
collaborative relationship.  Clear communication of expectations will prove essential to 
building ethical trust and avoiding a collapse or breakage, either intentionally or 
unintentionally.  Once ethical trust is broken, it is extremely difficult to regain, if at all.  
Any organization attempting to build a collaborative network must also understand that 
the expectations for each participating organization will most likely be different.  
Understanding the needs for specific information will avoid costly miscalculations and 
time-consuming efforts for nothing.  In addition to expectations, one must also 
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understand the capabilities of each organization.  A good example is the U.S. Navy 
carriers’ bandwidth capabilities.  Compared to the cruisers’ and destroyers’ 
communication capabilities, it is like night and day.  If the carrier’s intelligence center is 
responsible for providing intelligence support for its escort ships, sending large 
PowerPoint briefs and bandwidth-intensive products over e-mail is not understanding 
your customer’s needs and limitations.  The Independent Intelligence Specialist, 
Executive Officer, and Command Officer aboard the escort ships will likely receive the 
products late, or not at all, due to the size limitations.  This in turn sends the message that 
their intel needs are not a priority and are not being taken into consideration.  This leads 
to a break in ethical trust across many different channels.  Clear communication and 
understanding of the expectations and capabilities of your partners will support an ethical 
trust environment.  If all collaborative partners feel their needs are being met and 
considered, the likelihood of reciprocal trust will develop. 
The last trust type identified is emotional trust, which varies by situation and can 
go from one extreme to another.107  Emotional trust can stem from values and other 
influential cultural aspects.108  Emotional trust is desired, however, like anything else, a 
balance is needed.  Extremely high levels of emotional trust can often blind the more 
concrete aspects of competence and ethical trust.  One example of an extreme low in 
emotional trust would be an organization blaming the CIA for the failures of 9/11, 
accusing it of mishandling information and providing no value to national security.  That 
organization would be focused on one issue and completely ignore the complexity of an 
organization the size of the CIA and all the accomplishments it has made in the past.  
This is an example of extremely low emotional trust, however, emotional trust, unlike the 
other two trust types, can go from one extreme to another.  If the CIA was acknowledged 
for successfully thwarting an attack, their emotional trust value would likely rise in the 
eyes of that same organization. 
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Having identified the common threads of trust across the literature, the next step 
will be to identify how these trust types function and develop over time.  The most 
important element to point out is that the trust relationship is ultimately dependent upon 
the collaborative group as a whole.  The desire to have a trusted relationship must be 
present to support growth in new areas. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughead 
says, “Trust, personal trust, is indispensable to partnerships of any kind. … Trust cannot 
be surged.”109   Rohman points out that the trustor/trustee relationship is built upon each 
side displaying either trusting or trustworthy behavior, depending upon the situation and 
the role each organization is playing at any given time.110 The trustor/trustee relationship 
is said to reach maximum effectiveness and utility when both trusting and trustworthiness 
are high (all three levels of trust types are high), but not extreme.111 Any other 
combination is viewed as inefficient and possibly damaging to future collaboration (see 
Table 1.).112 
 
Table 1.   From A New Tool for Project Managers, Understanding the Need for Both 
Trusting and Trustworthiness Relationships113 
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The next chapter will attempt to analyze inter-agency relationships between the 
U.S. military and other U.S. government and private sector agencies to identify the 
structural formulations and inter-personal relationships that should exist to build trust.  
The author put specific emphasis on whether the theoretical suggestions of scholars on 
trust are in any way being implemented between these organizations.  It will be difficult 
to prove whether the U.S. military and inter-agency organizations are successful at 
building trust between each other, which is why this thesis focuses on the analysis of the 
adequacy of the structures put in place that will most likely lead towards trust building.  
Where appropriate, the author will provide judgment as to whether the theoretical models 
are actually having the results they predict based on anecdotal evidence and personal 
experience. 
Having identified the common threads within the trust doctrine, the following 
chapter will attempt to understand whether these three trust types have played a role in 
the success of the collaborative environment developed within the JIATF-S organization 
in order to understand whether they can be applied effectively within the newly 
established NMIC.  Chapter IV will review the following questions, and attempt to 
answer them based on anecdotal evidence and past experiences, in order to understand 
whether the three common trust threads of trust development identified have had an 
impact on the success of these organizations.  The following questions will help reveal 
the impact of the common trust threads in order to understand their utility in building 
trusted collaborative environments within the following cases: 
Does your organization show drive in finishing a task or project or finding an 
answer to a complex problem?  Trust will run low if the organization’s overall mission 
does not match up with the actions by its employees. Action will support trust building 
and will build confidence in the overall level of competence of the organization as a 
whole. 
Does your organization practice openness in regards to information sharing? 
Withholding information amongst departments and other collaborating organizations will 
often lead to a break in ethical trust—which is almost always irreversible. 
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Is the command leadership in line with the mission of the organization? 
Consistent and reinforced behavior from the leadership will ultimately support 
competence trust by supporting a constructive environment that aligns mission objectives 
with information sharing efforts; what I say is what I do. 
Are there methods in place to provide feedback to both consumer and provider in 
order to better answer the needs of the collaborative whole?  This will support ethical 
trust because both the trustor and trustee will see that their needs drive the production 
process.  Additionally, clear communication is the key factor for keeping emotional trust 
stable and for avoiding any breakage in the collaborative relationship. 
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IV. A TRUSTED COLLABORATIVE ORGANIZATION (JIATF-S) 
AND A FAILED COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENT (NOVEMBER 
2008 MUMBAI ATTACKS) 
The following chapter will review the development of trust in the JIATF-S 
organization and how that trust bond is pivotal to the development of a successful 
collaborative environment, on both the organizational and inter-personal levels. This 
chapter will look at the applicability of the three common threads of trust identified in the 
previous chapter and will review how JIATF-S, in their own unique way, has applied 
specific trust concepts in order to effectively build a successful collaborative 
environment. Additionally, this chapter will review the failure of trust, integration, and 
collaboration that took place in Mumbai, India in November of 2008 in order to 
understand the pitfalls of distrust within a non-collaborative environment. 
The necessity for interagency collaboration in the United States Intelligence 
Community has never been greater, thus there is a need to try to understand the ideal 
environment needed to build trust in inter-agency organizations.  It has become 
increasingly apparent, in an asymmetric threat environment, that coordination amongst 
intelligence organizations is essential to prioritize the work, minimize duplication, follow 
suspected threats, and corroborate multiple data sources in order to respond to specific 
threats with unified action.  This thesis is not arguing that inter-agency coordination is 
easy by any means.  Coordination within an inter-agency environment faces the daunting 
tasks of blending cultural biases, agency norms and functions, and specific ways of doing 
business.  This process is extremely difficult and it requires a continuous cycle of 
development, nurturing, and transformation to reach its efficacy of true inter-agency 
coordination.  The relationships that are established early on will ultimately define the 
utility of an inter-agency organization.  This chapter will attempt to show how trust 
development within JIATF-S has supported the collaborative environment that has 
matured over time, and how trust building is a critical factor for responding to the 
dynamic threat environment that exists today. 
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A. JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE—SOUTH (JIATF-S) 
While there is obviously already a long-standing history of maritime intelligence 
within ONI, there are lessons to be learned by other agencies that have adapted and 
practiced inter-agency coordination within the maritime realm, which are considered by 
many in the inter-agency to be extremely successful.  This chapter will review the 
development of JIATF-S and its inter-agency design.  Established in 1994 in Key West, 
Florida as a counter-drug tool, JIATF-S has become a model for inter-agency 
organizational design due to its ability to streamline information and break down 
institutional and international barriers that once crippled a quick response to narco-
traffickers.   
Subordinate to USSOUTHCOM, JIATF-S is unique in its design as it is manned 
by members from all U.S. service branches and the following U.S. government agencies: 
ONI, DHS, DEA, FBI, NSA, NRO, CIA, and NGA.  The thirteen foreign agencies 
represented at JIATF-S include: Argentinean Air Force, Brazilian Agency, Colombian 
Air Force and Navy, Ecuadorian Air Force, French Navy, Mexican Navy, Royal 
Netherlands Navy, Peruvian Air Force, UK Royal Navy, Spanish Guardia Civil, and 
Venezuelan Air Force. 
With this wide assortment of different organizations and nations within JIATF-S, 
the needs of each organization vary, but the mission of JIATF-S is clear and succinct. 
Ultimately, it supports the focus and the goals of the organization overall and enables 
multiple organizations to converge on the unified issue of narco-terrorism.   
JIATF-S aligns its operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation on 
narco-trafficking targets.  It detects, monitors, and then hands off these targets to law 
enforcement agencies or the military.  A typical mission sequence encompasses a 
carefully orchestrated series of handoffs that begins with interagency intelligence 
collection, then flows to military detection, sorting and monitoring of events, and 
concludes with the transfer of responsibilities for interception, arrest and prosecution to 
the law enforcement community.  JIATF-S also promotes security cooperation through 
counterdrug engagement with host nations and supports country team and partner nation 
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initiatives on foreign soil. Throughout its efforts, JIATF-S focuses on terrorist 
organization involvement in the drug trade as a means to further terrorist activities.   
1. Mission Focus and Alignment Within JIATF-S 
In the early stages of developing JIATF-S, Department of Defense (DoD) leaders 
were particularly keen on establishing an interagency task force to synchronize U.S. 
government actions against narco-trafficking.  Nevertheless, multiple agencies had 
concerns that such a task force might delay, rather than facilitate, the flow of counter-
narcotic information.  As the task force matured, three attributes contributed most to its 
effectiveness: a shared vision of the importance of its task, location in a single command 
and control space, and the shared experiences of its members. 
JIATF-S mission, vision and goals are defined and serve as the backbone to 
mission development within the task force and create a unified response from the various 
agencies within JIATF-S.  This task force was designed around the shared idea and focus 
that the problem of illegal drug flow was too large for any one organization or nation to 
take on unilaterally, therefore, the requirement for a more robust inter-agency 
counternarcotics organization was needed to combat drug trafficking.  
Prior to the creation of the Joint Task Force, the United States Coast Guard 
carried the major responsibility of responding to and interdicting narco-traffickers, 
however, with limited assets, and poor coordination and relations between disparate 
agencies, the well-funded narco-traffickers would often go unscathed.114  A custom 
official even notes, “Back then, Coast Guard and Customs service air stations refused 
even to coordinate flight schedules or patrol grids to avoid useless duplication of 
effort.”115 Miami Air Branch Chief Robert Viator is amazed at the transformation that 
has taken place over the last decade, recalling the establishment of a combined Customs 
and Coast Guard air operations center prior to the establishment of JIATF-S. Viator 
witnessed the ribbon-cutting event where the customs commissioner broke ground 
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followed by the Coast Guard commandant shoveling the dirt back into the hole made by 
the customs commissioner.116 Viator claims he overheard the Coast Guard commandant 
say, “Whatever you do, I can undo!”117 What was once the predominant way of 
conducting business in counter narcotics has slowly faded away with the realization that 
narco-trafficking is an epidemic and each agency has limited assets to bring to the fight.  
Turf battles and stove-piped organizations were, therefore, counter-productive.  The goal 
became the merging of the capabilities of each agency and nation and the breakdown of 
barriers between agencies to provide a unified response to narco-trafficking. 
The evolution of JIATF-S has provided many lessons.  First, it highlights the 
types of challenges that organizations with diverse and sometimes conflicting missions 
face in integrating efforts to address a complex and dynamic problem.  Some of these 
challenges—the need to establish confidence in the new group’s ability to participate, and 
define roles and relationships—are consistent with those found in other inter-
organizational groups in both the public and private sectors.  JIATF-S has succeeded in 
identifying and focusing its mission, supporting all of the partner agencies and nations 
contributing to a common goal.  By doing so, JIATF-S has “…target[ed] specific 
missions and clearly defined their objectives, to include detecting, monitoring and 
targeting narco-terrorists and the drugs they profit from.”118  Because each agency within 
JIATF-S has a vested interest in achieving these objectives, the collaboration and 
openness of the unified response has proven to be successful in aligning the necessary 
resources from each agency to combat this difficult issue.119   
The following mission, vision, and goals of JIATF-S were designed to support the 
collaborative whole by building a unified front where trust is paramount: 
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JIATF-S Mission—Conduct interagency operations against illicit 
trafficking by highly mobile asymmetric threats originating or transiting 
its joint operating area by detection and monitoring of illicit air and 
maritime targets, intelligence fusion, information sharing, and multi-
sensor correlation to facilitate interdiction and apprehension along with 
partner nations in support of national security and regional stability. 
JIATF-S Vision—JIATF-SOUTH will be the center of excellence for all-
resource fusion and employment of joint interagency and international 
capabilities to eliminate illicit trafficking posing a threat to national 
security and regional stability 
JIATF-S Goals—Eliminate the primary flow of illicit drugs in and through 
the joint operating area.  Expand to include all critical international and 
interagency partners.  Achieve 100 percent domain awareness of illicit 
trafficking.  Shape the command for success.120 
Development of a unified mission statement aligns each contributing organization 
to a specific cause and illustrates the types of decisions and actions that each participating 
agency will have to take to create the cooperative processes and the required 
communication necessary to be successful in creating a collaborative environment.  Trust 
scholar Markus Schobel finds that in high-reliability organizations, “Trust can be further 
based on perceived value congruence between trustor and trustee.”121  Therefore, in a 
time of crisis, or even day-to-day operations, “[Partners] will approach...situations in a 
way that is consistent with the general thrust of one’s expectations.”122  If each 
organization contributing to the inter-agency process understands the mission objectives 
and also feels they had a key role in developing the mission objectives, then a unified 
response, built around trust, will most likely develop. 
Each organization participating within JIATF-S has the expectation that their 
needs are being supported by the collaborative whole through this unified mission.  If this 
mission is achieved, its success provides the ideal environment for ethical trust to flourish 
by building a trust foundation through actions and reciprocity. Task force officials admit 
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that it has taken years “and many acrimonious cultural clashes” to build the trust 
environment that exists today at JIATF-S.123  JIATF-S is not an overnight success by any 
stretch. The trusted relationships that have been developed require constant nurturing and 
open communication amongst the stakeholders.  Intelligence Analyst Robert Clark refers 
to this as “sharing soft information” with the collaborative whole to build rapport, such as 
sharing “ideas, questions, problems, objections, opinions, assumptions and 
constraints.”124   
Additionally, the legal underpinnings and agreements between the interagency 
and international partners provide the structural foundation and evidentiary support that 
each organization requires in order to operate within a defined trusted environment.125   
2. Information Sharing Within JIATF-S 
Information sharing is by far the most critical element within the JIATF-S 
organization.  Without timely and actionable intelligence dissemination to the proper 
authorities, the command would be rendered useless.  JIATF-S is a DoD command, 
therefore the military personnel within the command cannot serve as law enforcement 
personnel and interdict and arrest narco-traffickers suspected of illicit activity.  
Information sharing is critical to the task force because it enables law enforcement 
personnel to act on actionable intelligence in a timely fashion.  Having built a level of 
competency trust over the last two decades, JIATF-S personnel have exhibited the know-
how and capability to detect and monitor suspected illicit activity.  A customs official 
shares his thoughts on how competency trust was built over time: 
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When I first arrived at JIATF-S years ago, it was a lot harder to get 
agencies such as the DEA, Customs, and the FBI to share intelligence, for 
fear that sources and methods might be compromised.  Increasingly, 
however, law enforcement agencies began to realize just what an 
incredible tool was being offered in terms of the intelligence capability of 
the Pentagon and national intelligence agencies.  That realization made us 
want to take part in JIATF-S.  This is the only place today you can get a 
common tactical picture based on intelligence fused from virtually every 
U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military agency.126 
Operating in a joint and international environment where resources are scarce and 
response to a potential contact can carry high costs, it can be assumed that competence 
trust is present within the JIATF-S organization.  If it were not, the majority of threat-
warning tippers would go unchecked and the response from partner nations would be less 
because the validity of the information would be questioned and scrutinized.  Therefore, 
information sharing and openness within the command has presumably played an integral 
role in building high levels of competence trust across the organization.  Information 
sharing barriers, which plague most agencies, have for the most part been dissolved 
within JIATF-S by bringing in liaison officers from every contributing agency.  Liaison 
officers provide the face-to-face contact that is essential in planning and conducting 
complex operations. Particularly sensitive information is generally handled by voice 
communication between individuals with trusted relationships.  The inter-personal trust 
that has been established has essentially dissolved agency barriers to information sharing.  
Additionally, agencies tend to assign more senior personnel who are more willing to set 
institutional biases aside for the sake of the mission, thus, JIATF-S has evolved from a 
directive organization to a cooperative organization. 
In the early stages of the development of JIATF-S, it became apparent that 
creating too many restrictions and demands on information sharing would likely impede 
cooperation and coordination amongst the task force participants. Therefore, each agency 
that originates the intelligence is given “...considerable latitude in deciding how this  
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intelligence will be disseminated to others at the task force.”127  Thus, the onus is on the 
respected agency to contribute to the collective whole and fuse intelligence into a 
common tactical picture. 
3. Leadership Design Within JIATF-S 
The unique command design within the JIATF-S organization is another key 
attribute that lends to supporting a trusted environment. In the early stages of 
development, leadership began with a U.S. Navy command slant and matured into a U.S. 
Coast Guard Flag Officer appointed as Director assisted by a Vice Director from law 
enforcement.  To achieve synergy and a trusted environment, the title “Commander” of 
the task force was changed to “Director” to merge cultures from a DoD-centric model 
that was stifling synergy and harboring individual agency turf concerns. The Director of 
JIATF-S still reports directly to the Commander of USSOUTHCOM, but as the 
designated leader of a reporting joint headquarters, not as a subordinate field commander.  
The Director, in reality, has numerous bosses outside DoD depending on the criteria of 
any given mission. 
Leadership roles throughout all departments within JIATF-S are filled by 
participating agencies (see Figure 4). A complete, integrated and shared approach is the 
ideal model for a collaborative command structure design to facilitate a trust bond 
between task force participants. “This integration promotes trust and facilitates the 
sharing of law enforcement investigative information, which is critical for any 
intelligence-driven organization.”128  Key leadership positions are shared amongst the 
participants.  “Both the Directors of Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but 
their Deputies are from the Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs and Border 
Protection.”129  Consideration for each organization is taken into account when assigning 
positions throughout the command.  For instance, “…if DEA agents have concerns about 
sharing sensitive information with allied military partners, they have a certain level of 
                                                 




confidence [competence trust] that the DEA Deputy Director for Intelligence will 
understand those concerns.”130  Therefore, each organization feels their interests are 
being considered and protected, thus establishing ethical trust amongst the collective 
whole.  This trust will remain high as long as a balance of power remains throughout the 
command structure and each agency feels their needs and requirements are integrated in 
the command design. 
 
Figure 4.   From Insights and Best Practices, JIATF-SOUTH Integrated Command  
Model131 
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4. Communication Methods and Feedback Within JIATF-S 
JIATF-S collaborative command structure eliminates the typical agency stove-
pipe mentality that is all too often prevalent within intelligence agencies.  The unique 
design enables an integrated approach to addressing a common concern for each 
contributing organization. JIATF-S is a prime example of an agency that has developed 
and transformed after two decades of integrated operations.  The JIATF-S model is not an 
overnight success by any means.  The diversity of the participating group brings about its 
own challenges.  Building the inter-personal relationships needed to combat narco-
trafficking has been a learning experience, but vital to the successful collaborative 
environment that has developed.  One senior government official shares his perspective 
on inter-personal relationships with an inter-agency environment: “The greatest system in 
the world does not overcome jerks and jerks will kill the greatest system in the world.  
And if people know each other and work together well, you don’t need the system.”132 
Each agency participating within JIATF-S is aware they cannot achieve success in this 
theater without the contribution of each and every organization participating, or at least 
without degrading overall capabilities.  
The cornerstone of JIATF-S is the central command center that hosts 
representatives and liaison officers from all participating agencies and nations.  The 
ability to be co-located not only breaks down the physical walls that separate each 
agency, it enables an ideal environment that supports inter-personal relationship 
development to build all three types of the common trust threads—competence, and 
ethical and emotional trust.  Blending so many different agencies is not an easy task, but 
with time, JIATF-S has managed to work through these hurdles, by defining mission 
objectives, developing inter-personal trust through the partnerships with liaison officers, 
and open communication and information sharing that supports a unified response to 
narco-trafficking.  These combined operations would not be possible without a merger of 
operations (e.g., law enforcement) and intelligence support.  A task force official states, 
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“Today, most (about 90%) of DoD’s actionable intelligence comes from law enforcement 
sources.”133 The evolution of DoD’s role within JIATF-S has been a key component to 
the success within JIATF-S.  This evolution process has resulted in the DoD acting in 
more of a supporting role versus a supported role within JIATF-S.  This required a 
tremendous cultural shift for the DoD to relinquish the reigns of its traditional role of lead 
agency for the sake of the unified mission.  Once this relationship was tested and found to 
be successful, the DoD has moderated its role within JIATF-S and actively fills a 
supporting role, as required.   
A trust bond must exist for such a complex process of correlating and 
disseminating intelligence to take place.  This is possible because a “Clear set of 
objectives [have been] agreed upon at the Principals’ level.”134  And while metrics for 
successful operations will vary between each organization, JIATF-S has developed an 
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each organization to avoid 
miscalculations in their planning and responses to operations.  Recognizing that each 
contributing command has unique requirements and different definitions of success in 
counter-narcotics, the unified goal of stopping narco-trafficking is what aligns each and 
every organization that participates in the task force. 
The Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program between the United States and Colombia 
provides an excellent example of communication failure and the necessity of defining 
parameters and guidelines to operate by.  The ABD program was established to interdict 
drug traffickers moving illegal drugs by aircraft in and out of Colombia to other South 
American countries. This is referred to as the “air bridge.”135 To reduce this drug 
trafficking, the United States began operating ABD in the 1990s in Colombia and 
Peru.136 The ABD program was designed to be a coordinated process where intelligence 
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derived from JIATF-S over the horizon radar and other sources would support Colombian 
officials in identifying suspected aircraft potentially involved in drug trafficking.   The 
program, however, faced setbacks in 2001 after the shooting down of a civilian aircraft in 
Peru.137  The United States Government Accountability Office conducted an official 
review and found communication, or the lack thereof, played a large role in the accidental 
shoot down of the civilian aircraft.  Following this horrific event, new guidelines were 
put in place to address the communication faults that contributed to this egregious error.  
A letter of agreement was signed between Columbia and the United States, which 
outlined each nation’s responsibility to provide safe operating conditions.138  Designated 
safety personnel (a total of three), including a representative from JIATF-S, oversee each 
mission and each have the authority to stop a mission if safety is a concern.139  To ensure 
that these safeguard mechanisms are implemented, a designated communication line is 
required before every mission.140  In addition to providing safeguards, each safety 
monitor, crewmember, weapons controller, and ground support element must be fluent in 
both Spanish and English.  The GAO found that, “The aircrews involved in the Peru 
accident had flown on previous operational mission together... however, they were not 
proficient enough to communicate clearly during the high stress of an interception.”141  
Understanding the limitations of your partner nations and agencies and identifying 
methods to communicate are essential for establishing all three trust threads; the failure to 
do so in any operation could damage your credibility (competence) your intent (ethical) 
and having to deal with the outcome (emotional). 
B. FAILURE TO CREATE COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENT—
NOVEMBER 2008 MUMBAI ATTACKS 
The 26–29 November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai resulted in 165 deaths, 
including six Americans, and injured over 300 innocent civilians.  Terrorists effectively 
                                                 
137  United States Government Accountability Office, Air Bridge Denial Program. 
138  Ibid. 
139  Ibid. 
140  Ibid. 
141  Ibid. 
 51
used highly mobile tactical assault teams to conduct simultaneous attacks on multiple 
targets in a crowded population center, thus exploiting soft targets, overwhelming first 
responders, and increasing the death counts.  Reports following the event indicate the 
Pakistani Lashkar-e-Tayyiba operatives charged with committing the siege used a 
maritime insertion into Mumbai to avoid Indian authorities and capitalize on the element 
of surprise.  The maritime insertion enabled the terrorists to reach Mumbai’s population 
center and achieve tactical surprise with relative ease.  Armed with assault rifles, 
handguns, grenades and IEDs, ten terrorists operating in autonomous teams were able to 
shut down a city of 20 million for almost four days. 
India’s divided network of government agencies, intelligence services, and poorly 
trained local police served as the weak links in this catastrophic event.  The lack of a 
trusted collaborative network voided any threat warning that was available from reaching 
first responders and potential targets.142 Chief of India's Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh 
Mehta, claims, “The attacks exposed holes in intelligence-gathering and joint security 
action.”143 This first-hand account offers a view of the rigid dichotomy between Indian 
national intelligence services and local/regional law enforcement communication.  
Shortly after the attack, the Commander-in-Chief of Western Naval Command noted that 
all available assets were ordered to locate the mother ship, which aided in delivery of the 
 LET terrorists.  He stated, “If even a percentage of these very forces were deployed in a 
coordinated manner earlier based on the intelligence that was available, there was a good 
chance of thwarting the attack.”144 
The Mumbai attack is the not the worst attack in Indian history, however, its 
success in terrorizing an entire city for multiple days is why it is often referred to as 
India’s 9/11 attack.  The multiple attacks and the prolonged nature of the catastrophic 
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event created a worldwide audience in complete shock as to how such a low tech, small 
group could cause so much harm to so many.145  Additionally, this attack has had effects 
on large cities with maritime access worldwide, revealing how susceptible the maritime 
domain can be without a coordinated effort to guard it. 
India’s response, during the 60-hour siege of Mumbai, highlighted key 
weaknesses in information sharing, command and control, and proper training, tactics and 
procedures for coordinating between multiple agencies in India.  While not conclusive, 
the following list summarizes and highlights two major failures in India’s response to 
handling the crisis management of the Mumbai attacks: 
1.  Intelligence dissemination on an imminent attack against Mumbai was not 
shared with the proper authorities or potential targets.146  “…criticism that fishermen, the 
Home Ministry and foreign and domestic intelligence agencies all recorded strange 
chatter or received warnings of imminent attacks that were never acted upon.”147  This 
intelligence was also never shared or corroborated with local law enforcement officials, 
nor was there a central nerve center where coordinated efforts took place amongst all 
maritime stakeholders.   
2.  For the first five hours, there was no unified command structure or 
coordination process in place to address an attack of this magnitude.148  Mumbai lost 
three of its top anti-terrorism officials almost immediately when the violence began; they 
were gunned down as they rode together in a van.    
While this is not an exhaustive list of Indian failures in response to the Mumbai 
attacks, it does offer a glimpse of the glaring inadequacies of India’s ability to create a 
trusted collaborative environment and its failure to communicate critical maritime 
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intelligence in a time-sensitive manner with local/regional law enforcement officials.  It 
also raises the question of how the United States’ national intelligence services would 
coordinate and disseminate maritime intelligence to the right people in a similarly styled 
threat environment.  The National Maritime Intelligence Center is designated the 
clearing-house for national maritime intelligence, however, the paths for distribution and 
coordination are still unclear.  The Mumbai attacks offer lessons learned that designing 
and implementing a collaborative environment post-mortem is not ideal.  While India has 
created Multiple Agency Centers (MACS) to coordinate information sharing amongst 
agencies, the resentment and lack of trust that now exists between India’s local, regional 
and national agencies is likely extremely high, and the process of establishing a strong 
working relationship that involves information sharing will probably take an extended 
period of time.149 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In these examples of law enforcement and maritime intelligence, we see that the 
theoretical propositions of trust claimed by leading scholars are relevant and necessary in 
an interagency environment.  Interagency organizations must engender trust by 
encouraging trust-facilitating behavior at an inter-personal level as well as at an 
organizational level.  While each member of an inter-agency force must commit to 
principles such as Covey’s four principles of trust, the organization as a whole must 
organize to facilitate accountability, reciprocal trust, and transparency in order to 
communicate effectively.  Providing empirical evidence of inter-personal trust is quite 
difficult and the examples provided here were only anecdotal, but the structures of 
organizational trust can be identified clearly in this interagency example.  Furthermore, 
while the sampling of the case studies presented was not exhaustive, the evidence of the 
structural factors of organizational trust in them are provocative and demonstrate that a 
growing number of agencies understand and are working towards a more comprehensive 
implementation of theoretical components of trust in their interagency relationships. 
It would be difficult to argue with the success JIATF-S has achieved in creating a 
trusted environment to date.  It has indeed been successful at unifying diametrically 
opposed agency cultures and achieving a trusted environment in order to address a 
national objective.  Leveraging shared interests to foster relationships and build trust has 
been the cornerstone of this organization and offers many lessons for establishing a 
trusted environment. The value of analyzing JIATF-S comes from examining the barriers 
that were broken down over time in regards to information sharing and the development 
of trust that flourishes within the organization today.  While there has never been a 
shortage of national attention and emphasis on the mission of counter-narcotics, this does 
not explain why the same emphasis has never been applied to creating an inter-agency 
coordination process or national guidance that supports similar objectives. Without a 
thorough review of JIATF-S lessons learned, other national mission objectives, like 
maritime domain awareness, will most likely have to go through the same growing pains 
and multiple re-organization processes in the hope of someday achieving mission 
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success.  A value set must be placed on educating intelligence professionals on the value 
of inter-agency operations and the necessity of an inter-agency trusted approach in 
today’s threat environment.   With today’s complex mission sets, conflicts do not end by 
defeating an enemy force or by simply capturing rogue pirates.  The threats U.S. forces 
face today peel back like an onion, revealing multiple layers of conflict and additional 
mission sets, which inherently add additional intelligence requirements that often reach 
beyond the scope and training of the U.S. military intelligence services.  It is imperative 
that intelligence services learn to operate within an interagency environment so that 
information sharing, or the lack thereof, does not delay a response to a crisis situation.  A 
failure to do so could potentially weaken the intelligence community’s utility to decision 
makers and may result in missed opportunities to thwart an attack on U.S. soil.  
The National Maritime Intelligence Center has taken on a tremendous amount of 
responsibility to serve as the national hub for maritime intelligence.  One variable that 
will be critical to the success of the NMIC is whether they are able to identify and 
communicate with the maritime community as a whole.  An aggressive outreach initiative 
program is essential for identifying the needs and requirements that exist within the 
maritime community, with regards to homeland security, in order to understand the 
releasability issues and the procedures needed to communicate and build a trusted 
working relationship.  With that said, the NMIC must think in terms of inclusion, rather 
than exclusion, with its stakeholders during its intelligence production phases.   As the 
JIATF-S case study showed, this mindset is imperative to building ethical trust within an 
inter-agency environment.  
The JIATF-S case study also revealed the success of having a centralized 
command center that was staffed and led by members of participating agencies.  While 
this is certainly an endeavor the NMIC should attempt to implement, there will be 
members of the maritime community that will be financially constrained to do so.  That 
being said, the NMIC should focus on creating other avenues of information sharing with 
the maritime community in order to create an environment of trust. Should the NMIC 
provide liaison officers to all state fusion centers that have a maritime responsibility? 
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Questions like this will have to be hashed out, but are important because the focus should 
not be on creating the standard uniformed agency, but on creating an agency accessible to 
those in need of maritime intelligence. 
The mindset of write-for-release is a concept that has been recommended 
numerous times following the attacks on September 11, 2001. Writing for release to your 
interagency partners creates avenues for collaboration and allows partners to interact, 
inform, and share information in a timely fashion. This in turn ensures all partners 
maintain shared situational awareness and have access to all relevant threat information.  
While this is only one avenue to explore for information sharing, it offers key insights 
into the thought process of identifying with the stakeholders to establish trust and 
understand their needs and capabilities.  Keeping with the traditional ad-hoc, and largely 
personality driven (good ol’ boy), way of information sharing amongst agencies that has 
existed for sometime, is not ideal and will most likely result in failure to create trust in 
any environment.  Today’s inter-agency environment requires engagement at all levels, 
both multilevel and multifarious. Establishing a trusted inter-agency collaborative 
environment in today’s threat environment will ultimately be the deciding factor of 
intelligence relevance or failure.  
A. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis was heavily focused on creating trust within an organization.  Other 
collaborative models exist that have helped organizations achieve a collaborative 
environment with their external partners and these are worth exploring in an effort to 
understand the utility of creating an alternative to the environment prescribed in this 
thesis.  One model, in particular, is the New York Police Department (NYPD) SHIELD 
program that connects intelligence and critical infrastructure professionals with private 
business security firms and concerned citizens.  This design is interesting because while 
there is no centralized command center for security representatives throughout New York 
City, NYPD SHIELD connects with its private security partners through outreach 
officers.  These officers offer on-site inspections and assistance with regard to security 
and vulnerability assessments, and through an interactive web portal that is constantly 
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updated with threat information, vulnerability assessments and intelligence analysis of 
world events and the implications for New York City.  What is unknown about this case 
study is whether security professionals are operating out of necessity, following the 
horrific events of 9/11 (without a trusted environment), or as a collaborative whole 
(trusted environment) that realizes a trusted environment is necessary to piece scarce 
threat information together.   This is worth exploring if it does, in fact, create a trusted 
environment, as a potential alternative design for organizations such as the NMIC to 
study and utilize in an inter-agency environment.   
Regardless of the design model, organizational and interpersonal trust has been 
identified as a pivotal factor for establishing collaboration in both the private and public 
sectors.  Breaking down cultural divides requires an all-hands approach. The results of a 
trusted interagency operational culture will support its effectiveness in the same fashion 
joint operations have in traditional military operations.  The National Maritime 
Intelligence center has continued to transform and evolve to meet the challenges of the 
21st century. The organizational and cultural products of true inter-agency trusted 
collaboration possess many salient characteristics that the interagency community and its 
partners will need to address the challenges of today’s national security concerns.  “Inter-
agency operations hold the same promise that amphibious operations did a century ago: 
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